Research

My primary research interests are at the intersection of normative ethics, moral psychology, philosophy of race, and feminist philosophy. I'm particularly interested in exploring dimensions of what Iris Murdoch called the inner moral life, as well as how living under oppression changes the moral evaluation of one's actions and moral attitudes. Below on the left I have an outline of my dissertation which is currently in progress. On the right side are some papers in progress.

Perceiving through the racial veil:
​the inner moral life of racism

Overview

My dissertation aims to answer questions about the moral psychology of racism and its interpersonal dimensions by learning from the insights of what Iris Murdoch called the inner moral life. On my view, systemic racism produces a veil that distorts our perception of the world in the same way Iris Murdoch believes our self-preoccupied anxieties creates a veil that distorts our perception. The veil not only distorts our perception of people of color, leading to morally problematic actions, but this misperception is morally problematic in itself, which can lead to a damaged character. This damaged character results from an internalization of racial superiority and requires a change in attention to overcome. 

The Inner Moral Life: Loving attention and Orientation

I argue that Murdoch's insight about an inner moral life rests on understanding two interrelated senses of attention. On the one hand, you need to perceive a situation or person properly in order to come to know what to do. You need to look, as she puts it, with just and loving attention. On the other hand, she discusses reorienting our attention toward the good. In this chapter, I aim to understand the relationship between these two senses of attention—what I call loving attention on the one hand, and orientation on the other. Understanding this relationship, I take it, is the key to understanding Murdoch’s insight about the importance of the moral inner life. My project then, is not to do straightforward Murdoch exegesis—determining exactly what Murdoch meant—but to articulate how we ought to understand her insight and make it serviceable for my project of understanding interpersonal racism. 

The Racial Veil

My aim in this chapter is to understand the moral non-knowings of white ignorance, using the insight about the moral inner life from Iris Murdoch that I developed in the previous chapter. The idea being that there is a racial veil that functions in much the same way as the self-preoccupied veil Murdoch believes inhibits our moral perception. In understanding the moral inner life of racism, I believe we can make progress in understanding the moral dimensions of interpersonal racism. Much of the chapter will be spent doing two things. First, articulating the various details of the racial veil, specifically how stereotypes and misvaluing impedes our moral perception. Second, I will argue that this form or perception is morally problematic due to the way it draws one’s attention to race in a way that reinforces racial oppression. 

Perceptual Responsibility and How to do Things with Charges of Racism

Piercing the Veil: Loving Attention, Playfulness, and Moral Imagination

Beautiful Arrogance (under review)

In this paper I examine the attitude of arrogance in contexts of oppression, attempting to do three things. The first is to give an account of the moral psychology of arrogance, where arrogance is understood as believing oneself to be more important than others. The second is to utilize this account of arrogance to illuminate why people of historically oppressed groups are often called arrogant, even when they are not acting in a way that reflects the attitude of arrogance. Toward that end I present three possible explanations, two attend to the reasons why the viewers may believe these people are arrogant and one aims to understand the consequences of this practice, concluding that this practice reflects and reinforces the undervaluing of oppressed peoples. Third, I argue that in cases where oppressed people are arrogant it is not necessarily bad, but all things considered good due to its role in resisting oppression.

Gender Affirmation and Loving Attention (under review)

In this paper I examine the moral dimensions of gender affirmation. My contention is that a significant amount of gender affirmation's moral value lies in what Iris Murdoch called loving attention. I argue that loving attention is necessary for gender affirmation to have moral value because it is otherwise too fragile or insincere to have such value. Moral reasons to engage in acts that gender affirm will come from wanting to reflect this loving attention to trans folx as a way of challenging their marginalization.  In the latter part of the paper, I will see how my arguments bear on recent work by Robin Dembroff and Daniel Wodak on the use of gender-neutral language. In their paper, “He/She/They/Ze” they argue that we have a duty to gender neutralize English, such that we use no gendered pronouns whatsoever. (This conclusion turns, in part, on their rejecting gender affirmation as a moral duty.) I hope to show that my arguments should make us skeptical of this conclusion, in favor of perhaps a more nuanced and pluralistic approach to the ethics of gendering.